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reasonable conditions as may be deemed by the governing authority
of the country essential to the safety, health, peace, good order, and
morals of the community. Even liberty itself, the greatest of all
rights, is not unrestricted license to act according to one's own will.
3 2
The plight of the oppressed movie-producer or exhibitor trying to make
his next million is indeed touching. Now, thanks to the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court's opinions in the above decisions, he is free to display his movies, no
matter how corrupting and immoral, while he awaits (and perhaps by delaying
tactics postpones) a court determination on his film. By that time, his film's
appeal will have expended itself, and he may begin showing another more
dangerous than the first. Indeed, Justice Musmanno may be correct in fearing
his state may become "a cinematic Gomorrah." The legislature has once again
been defeated in its attempt to protect a vulnerable public from obscenity.
It would appear that even the so-called "stag movies" could now be shown in
theaters to children and teen-agers. Hopefully, the legislature will continue
trying to serve the public need for control, but how many times must it suffer
reverses at the hand of an unbending court? This is the plight of Pennsyl-
vania now. It still may be aided by informal means of control used in many
states-self-regulation within the movie industry by the Production Code or
private action groups such as the Legion of Decency, the National Board of
Review, or the "green sheet" compiled through the efforts of several national
organizations. 3 Although these unofficial controls have had years to develop,
their effectiveness remains uncertain, and does not as yet approximate
statutory regulation. In addition, most states have criminal statutes which can
punish exhibitors for showing obscene movies although they have no boards
of censors. These statutes have not been attacked as in Blumenstein. Penn-
sylvania has tried to give its citizens better protection than is afforded in other
states, but apparently the court does not recognize the need.
ROGER V. BARTH
INVOLUNTARY WAGE AsSIGNMENTS: A NEw APPROACH FOR EFFECTIVE EN-
FORCEMENT OF SUPPORT OBLIGATIONS
Moral obligations to support dependent persons have been supplemented
by both the common law and statute. As a moral duty alone is legally un-
enforceable, the common law courts and later the legislatures have been
confronted with the problem of either imposing a legal duty upon the proper
persons or allowing the moral obligation to result, through inaction, in a public
burden. The development of the legal duty at common law was a restrictive
32. Buffalo Branch, Mutual Films Corp. v. Breitinger, 250 Pa. 225, 95 At. 433,
436 (1915).
33. See Note, Entertainment: Public Pressures and the Law, 71 Harv. L. Rev.
326 (1957).
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one and extended only to one's wife and natural children.' Legislative reaction
to this rule came slowly, but as a result of a growing policy to shift the
primary burden of support from the public to the individual,2 this duty was
greatly expanded by statute.3 The primary duty thus established, the prac-
tical and more difficult problem of enforcing these obligations remained to be
solved, a process which is a continuing one because of changing social conditions.
The traditional enforcement procedures exemplified by sequestration,
garnishment, and contempt, or any variation provided by a specific state, are
available against a defaulting spouse who is under a court order for support.
New York, in addition, provides an involuntary wage assignment under
Section 49-b of the Personal Property Law. This section, aimed at maintaining
current payments, grants a court power to order that support payments be
deducted from wages. Feder v. Skyway Container Corporation, the latest
decision interpreting the new statute in New York, holds that support orders
pursuant to Section 49-b are given a priority to the effect that they will prevent
a simultaneous deduction for a garnishee order under Section 684 of the Civil
Practice Act.
4
Failure to support dependent persons may give rise to both criminal
sanctions and civil remedies. By statute, the majority of states penalize both
abandonment and non-support; 5 whereas, Illinois, for example, punishes only
non-support.0 New York, in somewhat a different manner, places criminal
sanctions on a group labeled as "disorderly persons. ' 7 They are classified as
persons who abandon their wives or children without adequate support or
leave them in danger of becoming a public burden. Also punished are those
persons who fail to provide support according to their means or threaten to
abandon the dependent person. Coexisting with these criminal sanctions are
the civil remedies, whereby a dependent may obtain a decree for support in
a civil action. In most cases, however, this decree will issue from suits or
actions to annul a marriage, divorce, or separation. Under these latter suits,
a default in payment under the decree will enable the claimant to return to
the original court which issued the decree, or in the case of a foreign decree,
to bring a new action in New York for the appropriate enforcement procedures.
The usual procedures, however, are available only for the collection of arrear-
ages, with the initiating event being a default in payment.
The right of a spouse to enforce a judgment for support has been called
1. See 14 St John's L. Rev. 333 (1940).
2. Id. at 344.
3. A mother is now liable for the support of her children under the age of twenty-
one, and a wife, for the support of her husband when he is incapable of supporting
himself or is likely to become a public charge. Also, an adult would be liable in like
fashion for his parents, and a grandparent for his grandchildren. N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law
§§ 32, 37.
4. - Misc. 2d-, 218 N.Y.S.2d 362 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
5. See 3 Vernier, American Family Laws § 162 (1st ed. 1935).
6. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 68, § 24 (1957).
7. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 899.
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a "vested right" with the same remedies available to her as are available to
all other judgment creditorss Although the procedures are controlled by
local practice, there are generally three methods of enforcing an order for or
judgment to pay support: sequestration, execution, and contempt. New York
provides for sequestration under two circumstances. Section 1171-a of the
Civil Practice Act authorizes sequestration of defendant's personal and real
property when he is not within the state or cannot be found for personal
service and has property within the state's jurisdiction. This section, which
is for jurisdictional purposes only, should not be confused with Section 1171
which provides for an order that security be given and applied to support
payments if there is a default. Under this section, if the defendant either fails
to give the required security or make the payments when they become due, the
court may order that his personal property and the rents and profits from his
real property be sequestered. If the rents and profits are insufficient to
eliminate the arrearages, upon application of the receiver, the court may order
the mortgage or sale of the property. 9 While similar powers are given to the
courts in Michigan and most other states,'0 the procedure only sets the prop-
erty aside so that upon a default in payment under the decree, the security will
be subject to execution. It insures that property will be available for execution,
but cannot be substituted for the defendant's obligation to make current
payments. Another limitation upon this procedure is the prohibition of seques-
tration of monthly earnings to become due. This relief cannot be ordered as
there must first be a property right in the husband in the property to be seques-
tered."' Although each payment may be regarded as a separate judgment
when it falls due, there may be no execution until there is a default in the
payment itself.'2 Section 1171-b of the New York Civil Practice Act gives
the court discretionary power to enter a judgment for the amount of the
arrears in support payments. Such judgment may then be enforced by execution
or in any other manner provided by law for the collection of money judgments.
By the conversion into a money judgment, the remedies of attachment and
garnishment also become available.
Finally, there is enforcement by contempt proceedings. In New York,
a judge is given discretion to issue an order to show cause why a defendant
should not be imprisoned after default when payments cannot be enforced by
either sequestration or otherwise.' 3 This situation most frequently arises when
a spouse is attempting to enforce a foreign divorce decree or where the
husband's property is beyond the jurisdiction of the state. The courts, in a
S. Accord, 27b C.J.S. Divorce § 253 (1959); Chester v. Chester, 62 N.Y.S.2d 229
(Sup. Ct. 1946).
9. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 1171.
10. 18 Mich. Stat. Ann. § 25.105; see generally 2 Nelson, Divorce and Annulment
§ 16.50 (2d ed. 1961).
11. Patterson v. Patterson, 251 App. Div. 272, 296 N.Y. Supp. 311 (1st Dep't 1937).
12. C.J.S., supra note 8 at § 265.
13. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 1172.
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majority of states, including New York, hold that this application of the
contempt procedure is valid as a civil contempt, and, therefore, would not be
prohibited as an imprisonment for a debt.1 4 Maryland, on the other hand, holds
that a decree for the support of a child is a debt and is not enforceable by
contempt; whereas, an unsegregated amount awarded to the wife which includes
support for a child is essentially alimony, not a debt, and thereby enforceable
through this proceeding. 5 All expenses incurred by a spouse who must resort
to the preceding remedies may be awarded to her against the defaulting spouse
in New York.16
The effectiveness of the enforcement statutes is further aided by the Uni-
form Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act which has been adopted by every
state except New York.17 New York has adopted the Uniform Support of
Dependents Law,' 8 which in a similar way permits reciprocity. The statute
provides a procedure whereby a dependent residing in one state may enforce
the support obligations of persons residing in another state without acquiring
a prior in personam judgment. This eliminates a means of circumscribing the
enforcement procedures when a father could abscond to another state with
his property and thereby avoid enforcement of his support obligation.
These statutes provide an adequate and effective procedure against a
defaulting spouse for the collection of arrearages, but are limited to arrearages.
Generally the same traditional methods are available to all judgment creditors,
the purpose of which are the collection of unsatisfied judgments. The tra-
ditional approaches are limited by the traditional rules, which may not be in
the best interests of a dependent. The concept of a property right, as seen
before,' 9 prevents the sequestration of monthly wages to become due. Al-
though an analogy has been made between a judgment and a support order,
whereby each payment becomes a separate judgment as it falls due, the
analogy is hardly satisfactory upon considering a woman and her children who
have to rely upon prompt payments in order to meet their everyday expenses.
A dependent could be required to bring the recalcitrant spouse into court or
at least apply to the court an unlimited number of times in order to collect
payments. Such procedures are not inexpensive and they are time consuming.
The defaulting spouse may be required to pay the litigation expenses of the
other, but the expenses are an immediate burden on the person least equipped
to meet them. A new approach was needed in this area. A dependent requires
a method which will insure prompt payments in addition to the collection
procedures available for arrearages. Genuine security requires regularity of
14. Nelson, supra note 10 at § 16.06.
15. Knabe v. Knabe, 176 Md. 606, 6 A.2d 366 (1939); see Nelson, supra note 10
at § 16.03.
16. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 1172-d.
17. See Kelso, Reciprocal Enforcement of Support: 1958 Dimension, 43 Minn. L.
Rev. 877 (1958-59).
18. N.Y. Dora. Rel. Law §§ 30-43.
19. Supra note 11.
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payments, which the statutes are neither equipped nor intended to guarantee.
Consequently, New York,20 and more recently Illinois, 21 have enacted invol-
untary wage assignment statutes, whereby a certain amount each month is
deducted from the employee's salary by the employer and paid directly
to the dependent subsequent to an order of the court. These amounts are
paid as the support payment accrues, thereby eliminating the initiating require-
ment of a default before the enforcement procedures are started in motion.
Section 49-b of the Personal Property Law of New York provides that
where there is a court order for the support of one's spouse or minor children,
the court has discretionary power to order the employer to deduct from the
wages, salary or commissions of the employee certain amounts which the
court finds to be necessary for compliance with the order to support. The
monthly deductions are to take priority over all other wage assignments or
garnishments except those deductions made mandatory by law, such as union
dues. An order under Section 49-b may operate to enforce support orders
authorized by' the Domestic Relations Law, which provide for the support
and education of children born out of wedlock and to establish paternity;2 2
the Uniform Support of Dependents Law; 23 support proceedings under the
Children's Court Act; 24 criminal proceedings for unlawfully omitting to pro-
vide for a child; 2 5 the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure defining
disorderly persons;26 and finally those sections of the Civil Practice Act
establishing actions to annul a marriage,27 for divorce,28 for separation,2 0
and other matrimonial actions.30 Because of its recent enactment (1958),
there are few judicial decisions interpreting this statute.
Section 49-b has been held by the lower courts to be merely a new
means for the enforcement of an order for support, whether it is under a
criminal prosecution for non-support or pursuant to a decree for alimony,31
and in each case the prior jurisdiction, whether in rem or in personam, is
sufficient for an order under this section.32 No additional service of process
is necessary to give the court jurisdiction, although notice must be given to
the husband in order for him to defend against the issuance of the order.33
The court which first issued the order for support, however, must have had
20. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 49-b.
21. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 40, § 21.1; ch. 68, § 23.1 (1957).
22. N.Y. Doam. Rel. Law §§ 119-131.
23. Supra note 18.
24. N.Y. Children's Court Act §§ 30-33.
25. N.Y. Penal Law § 482.
26. Supra note 7.
27. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act §§ 1132-1146.
28. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act §§ 147-160.
29. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act §§ 1161-1165.
30. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act §§ 1165a-1176.
31. Wcisel v. Wcisel, 27 Misc. 2d 695, 212 N.Y.S.2d 895 (Sup. Ct. 1961); De Jongh
v. De Jongh, 13 Misc. 2d 882, 177 N.Y.S.2d 53 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
32. De Jongh v. De Jongh, supra note 31.
33. Ibid.
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proper jurisdiction before any order may issue from Section 49-b.34 In
Ross v. Ross,3 as the husband was a non-resident and there was no prior
seizure of his property in this state, the court in the first instance lacked
jurisdiction to grant the award of alimony, and, therefore, no deduction from
wages could be made under this section.
An important feature of the involuntary wage assignment is that the
decision of the judge is entirely discretionary.3 6 This prevents the procedure,
an admittedly harsh measure, from being a tool of harassment in the hands
of a vengeful spouse. It must be shown to the judge's satisfaction that an
order is essential, and unless unusual circumstances are shown, the order will
not be issued when the "husband is current and ostensibly complying with
the order of the court."37 In Kenney v. Kenney,38 the court declined to ex-
ercise its power as the husband was currently making prompt payments,
his past defaults not being sufficient to show a present need for a deduction
from wages.
May arrearages be reduced by a deduction from the employee's wages
under Section 49-b? The lower courts have held that an order pursuant to
that section is for current support only, and since the statute does not
specifically authorize a deduction for either arrearages or counsel fees, it
must not have been the intention of the legislature to include these items
within the statute.39 On this point, Favil D. Berns in the Illinois Bar Journal
discussed the newly enacted involuntary wage assignment law in Illinois
and expressed the opinion that the statute should not be restricted to current
payments as the New York statute has been.40 The Illinois statute does not
expressly provide for the reduction of arrearages, 41 and the author felt that the
full scope and purpose of the statute would not be accomplished unless the court
or the legislature allowed for this reduction. It appears, however, that the
legislature, at least in New York, did not intend to duplicate the existing
enforcement procedures, but to insure current payment by the creation of
a means calculated to provide the dependent with a means of subsistence.
42
The long range purpose of the legislation was to lighten the overburdened
court load and to decrease the possibility that dependent families would be
forced to go on welfare.
A conflict has arisen in the lower courts concerning the relationship
34. Ross v. Ross, - Misc. 2d -, 215 N.Y.S.2d 905 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
35. Ibid.
36. Kenney v. Kenney, 28 Misc. 2d 652, 216 N.Y.S.2d 156 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
37. Id. at 652, 216 N.Y.S.2d at 157.
38. Supra note 36.
39. Renaudo v. Renaudo, 20 Misc.2d 963, 190 N.Y.S.2d 285 (Sup. Ct. 1959);
Langus v. Langus, 16 Misc. 2d 648, 183 N.Y.S.2d 922 (Sup. Ct. 1959); De Jongh v.
De Jongh, supra note 31.
40. Berns, Wage Assignment in Divorce and Separate Maintenance, 48 IlI. Bar J.
912-922 (1959-60).
41. Supra note 21.
42. Cf. Langus v. Langus, supra note 39.
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between Section 49-b, which gives a priority to these payments, and limita-
tions generally on garnishments and voluntary wage assignments in New
York. Subsection 2 of Section 49-b gives these orders a priority over all other
assignments and garnishments of wages, whereas, Section 684 of the Civil
Practice Act permits the enforcement of only one garnishee execution at any
one time. An Opinion of the Attorney General in 1959 stated that an order
under Section 49-b was not a garnishee execution, and, therefore, Section
684 did not prevent the simultaneous deduction of support payments and a
garnishee execution or a voluntary wage assignment.43 Under this inter-
pretation of Section 49-b, the statute was to be read alone without reference
to other statutory limitations, and the priority clause, giving only a preference,
would not effect an exclusion of other deductions. Following this interpretation
of the statute, the Supreme Court held in Loan Service Corporation v. Bridge-
port Lumber Co., Inc. 44 that there could be simultaneous deductions and that
the provision for priority could not render the employee's wage immune
from judgment creditors indefinitely. In this case there was a prior wage
assignment which arose from a loan made by the plaintiff. Upon a default
in payment, the plaintiff sent a copy of the wage assignment to the defendant-
employer for the appropriate deductions. The employer refused to comply with
it because of an order under Section 49-b which was issued subsequent to
the wage assignment. In holding that the priority clause does not prevent
simultaneous deductions, the court, relying heavily upon the Attorney General's
Opinion, reasoned that it would be inconceivable that the legislature in-
tended any other result.
The New York legislature has strictly limited these deductions from
an employee's wages. Section 684 of the Civil Practice Act and the wage
assignment sections of the Personal Property Law,45 which contain the same
limitation, state that there shall be only one execution or assignment operative
at a time and that it shall be limited to teu percent of wages. The legislative
purpose behind these sections was not only to protect the wage earner from
entering into unwise sales agreements but also to protect his family, the
innocent parties to the transaction. Despite the latter limitation, the judg-
ment creditor is given further relief by Section 793 of the Civil Practice Act,
which gives the Court the power to "order the judgment debtor to pay to
the judgment creditor or apply on the judgment, in installments, such portion
of his income . . . as the court may deem proper." This order, however, takes
into account the necessary expenses of the family, and the judge is given
discretion both as to whether to make the order and as to the amount to
be paid periodically. A creditor, therefore, need not wait for the full payment
of all outstanding garnishee executions before obtaining his relief.40 In view
43. 1959 Op. Atty. Gen. 103.
44. 27 Misc. 2d 938, 215 N.Y.S.2d 185 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
45. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law §§' 46-49a.
46. Feder v. Skyway Container Corporation, supra note 4.
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of the protective policy of the legislature, the following quotation from the
Loan Service case reveals the weakness in the reasoning of the court, ir-
respective of the decision's correctness. "The Court is aware that allowing
two salary deductions will leave D'Agostine precious little net salary. However,
D'Agostine himself is solely responsible for the unfortunate plight in which
he finds himself, and the situation is partly at least, if not entirely, of
D'Agostine's own making."47 This decision is weakened both by the preceding
reasoning and the failure to discuss the alternative remedy available to a
creditor under Section 793.
The Appellate Term, in Feder v. Skyway Container Corporation,
4" was
concerned with a similar situation as in the preceeding case, but decided the
case differently. In this case, however, the garnishee order came after the
Domestic Relations Court order under Section 49-b. The court states that
an order under Section 49-b always warrants a priority, which effects an
exclusion of all other garnishments or wage assignments. This does not defeat
the rights of creditors as they have the remedy, as previously mentioned, in
Section 793 which is over and above the limitations in Section 684. The
court held that simultaneous deductions are expressly prohibited by law.
The prohibition in Section 684 allows only one execution against wages at a
time, each to be satisfied in the order of their priority. Sections 46-49a of
the Personal Property Law, concerning voluntary wage assignments, continued
the same limitation as in Section 684. The court then reasoned that garnish-
ments and levies upon execution were grouped into the same class as as-
signments of future income, and that Section 49-b operates as all other
wage assignments except that it is involuntary and given a priority. The
result is that all the limitations as to voluntary wage assignments are in-
corporated into Section 49-b, and that the priority clause suspends all prior
executions on wages and prohibits future deductions as long as the involuntary
wage assignment is operative.
All of the arguments against this interpretation fall upon close scruntiny.
The dissentor states that this interpretation could lead to collusion between
spouses to defeat the rights of creditors. First of all, a creditor has the further
advantages under Section 793. A conceivable evil must not be allowed to over-
come the real benefit which the statute was designed to bring about when
there is both an absence of any experience with or real danger of this antici-
pated consequence. A final argument is waged on behalf of the employer.
As he is already a tax collector for the government, why must he also become
the disbursing agent for a delinquent employee? This argument might carry
some weight if there was to be a real burden on the employer. But with
only the additional cost of an entry on the ledger and another check, plus
47. Supra note 44 at 939, 215 N.Y.S.2d at 186.
48. Supra note 4.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
the small number of employee who would be affected, the argument is not sub-
stantial.
49
An inspection of the corresponding section of the Illinois statute reveals
one difference. The Illinois statute provides that such amounts are to be
deducted "without regard to any subsequent garnishment demands, pro-
ceedings, wage assignments or claims of other creditors. . . ,,"o This apparently
allows simultaneous deductions, although some priority for the support pay-
ments may be inferred. The same purpose, to provide an effective procedure
for the enforcement of orders for the support of dependents, is, however,
present.
One question, which is not expressly answered by the New York
statute or by the small number of cases available, is the duration of an order
for the involuntary wage assignment. While reasonableness may always be
read into a statute, judges who view the sweeping provisions of this section
less enthusiastically than others see an indefinite duration or one which
lasts at least as long as an obligatidn to support exists." Such a result, in
the absence of absolute necessity, would be undesirable. While many factors
could prompt an unwise failure to make prompt payments, more often than
not it would arise from temporary circumstances, such as bitter feelings,
because of a recent divorce or separation or the mere inability to make the
required payments. These temporary considerations certainly would not
warrant an indefinite liability for the wage assignment. The benefit obtained
by the order would not overcome the loss of both the personal and business
reputation of the husband when he becomes willing to pay voluntarily. Al-
though "one who is in arrears as to alimony, support or suit money is not
in favor with the court,"5 2 as he has violated a court order, an order under
Section 49-b terminating upon reasonable showing of a willingness to comply
with the court's order would allow for greater justice between the interested
parties.
Today, modern statutes specifically provide to whom the obligation of
support extends, and the trend from early common law is from placing the
burden on public welfare or the state to placing it on the individual. The
problem which must constantly be faced and resolved in light of changing
public demands and individual needs is how such obligations are to be ef-
fectively enforced. Traditional enforcement statutes provide for a retrospective
type of remedy, which acts only upon a default in payments. Some states
require that security be given, but again the operative factor here is a
default by the husband. New York and Illinois are trying to insure that
the current payments are met without the necessary application to a court
49. See supra note 43.
go. Supra note 21.
51. Supra note 44 at 939, 215 N.Y.S.2d at 186.
52. Nelson, supra note 10 at § 16.09.
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upon each default for the appropriate remedy. The new involuntary wage
assignment acts "provide a hopeful road to [the] prevention of large ar-
rearages, that extra load on court docket, and the thankless and usually
unprofitable time consuming collection task for the lawyers." 53 Public welfare
laws, although being damned currently by some, are not going to be repealed
by any progressive legislature; however, they should not enable an individual
by merely refusing to comply with a support order to shift his burden,
however temporary, upon the public. Wage assignment laws prevent de-
pendents, because of financial necessity, from having to resort to public
welfare because of inadequate means to enforce current payments, which
is inherent in the time consuming and expensive procedures ordinarily
available to these persons. Through procedures facilitating wage deductions
of the current obligations, the legislature is placing the primary obligation of
support upon the proper individual.
ROGER A. OLSON
CONCURRENT JURISDICTION IN MARITIME DEATH-FAITH IN A SEA FABLE?
The Federal Death on the High Seas Act' gives a right of action for
wrongful death where the locus delicti is the high seas. In the very language
of the Act authorizing this action, there seems to be a clear provision stated
as to the forum in which the action must be brought. Section One of the Act
provides:
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act,
neglect, or default occurring on the high seas beyond a marine league
from the shore of any State, or the District of Columbia, or the
Territories or dependencies of the United States, the personal repre-
sentative of the decedent may maintain a suit for damages in the
district courts of the United States, in admiralty, for the exclusive
benefit of the decedent's wife, husband, parent, child, or dependent
relative against the vessel, person, or corporation which would have
been liable if death had not ensued.2 (Emphasis added.)
Upon reading this section, it would come as no surprise to learn that the
majority of courts have understood the Act to limit the forum in which the
death action can be brought to the admiralty side of the federal district
courts.3 However, the New York Court of Appeals in the recent case of
53. Berns, supra note 40 at 917.
1. 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-767 (1958).
2. 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1958).
3. National Airlines v. Stiles, 268 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S.
885 (1959) ; Noel v. Linea Aeropostal Venezola, 247 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 907 (1957); Turner v .Wilson Line of Mass., 242 F.2d 414 (1st Cir. 1957); Higa
v. Transocean Airlines, 230 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 802 (1956);
The Silverpalm, 79 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1935); The Vestris, 53 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1931);
Wilson v. Transocean Airlines, 121 F. Supp. 85 (N.D. Cal. 1954); lafrate v. Cornpagnie
405
